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NO. 32 AUGUST 2019 Introduction 
Health and Security 
Why the Containment of Infectious Diseases Alone Is Not Enough 
Daniel Gulati and Maike Voss 
The Ebola epidemic in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) highlights the 
urgent need to strengthen cooperation between security, health, and development 
actors. As the disease spreads, the World Health Organization (WHO) has declared an 
international health emergency. In crisis situations like these, the interdependencies 
between health and security are highly complex. Which population groups and which 
diseases are perceived as suspected health risks, and why, is a normative question 
for donor countries. It has political consequences above all for affected developing 
countries. Where health and security are common goals, it is not enough to contain 
infectious diseases in developing countries. Instead, resilient, well-functioning, and 
accessible health systems must be established. This fosters the implementation of 
the human right to health, creates trust in state structures, and takes into account 
the security interests of other states. In the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the 
German government could advocate for policies based on the narrative “stability 
through health.” 
 
Since August 2018, the Ebola fever has 
again been rampant in the northeast of the 
DRC. To date, more than 2,500 people have 
fallen ill, more than 1,700 of whom have 
died. The outbreak is hitting a conflict-
ridden region where state authorities are 
mistrusted and militias commit violent 
acts. Attacks on humanitarian and medical 
personnel also claimed civilian lives, in-
cluding a WHO staff member. As a result, 
international organizations were forced to 
reduce or stop their relief efforts. The diffi-
cult security situation disrupts public order, 
the delivery of health care, and affects 
disease control. WHO has now declared a 
“public health emergency of international 
concern” (PHEIC) after the epidemic spread 
beyond the border into Uganda and to the 
Congolese city of Goma. WHO now needs 
greater international support and asked all, 
but especially neighboring countries, to 
keep their borders open so that interna-
tional assistance can arrive to the DRC. 
Due to the epidemic, people in the out-
break-affected and opposition-dominated 
provinces were not permitted to participate 
in the presidential election in 2018. More-
over, parts of the population rejected Ebola 
aid measures right from the start. This ex-
pression of resentment must be considered 
against the backdrop of long-standing dep-
rivation of basic human needs, for which 
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the population received scant attention 
from the international community. Only 
now, with a highly contagious disease out-
break, has global attention turned toward 
the crisis region, although there has been 
a lack of adequate international assistance 
for a long time. This situation forms the 
breeding ground for disease outbreaks, 
undermines the trust of the population in 
the state, and further destabilizes it. 
Health and Security – a Contro-
versial Concept with Tradition 
The first International Sanitary Conference 
in 1851 is known to be the starting point 
for international health cooperation. Since 
then, high-income countries have pushed 
the development of an international regime 
of infectious disease control, also because 
of their own security interests. Especially 
health and security actors have established 
the concept of so-called global health 
security in scientific debates and interna-
tional relations. 
In 2007, WHO identified the following 
topics as relevant to health security: 
∎ Environmental change 
∎ Poverty 
∎ Food insecurity 
∎ Violence 
∎ Conflicts and humanitarian crises 
∎ Strengthening health systems 
∎ HIV/AIDS 
∎ Diseases with significant effects on 
economic stability 
∎ Chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks 
and accidents 
∎ Emerging and reemerging (infectious) 
diseases 
In addition, antimicrobial resistance (AMR) 
is nowadays considered relevant for secu-
rity. This diversity in health topics shows 
that there is no uniform definition of so-
called global health security. Nevertheless, 
WHO’s binding international health regu-
lations (IHRs) are commonly understood as 
the international agreement on global 
health security. The IHRs comprise require-
ments for the prevention, notification, and 
control of infectious diseases for all WHO 
member states. In the event of a serious, 
unexpected, and unusual cross-border out-
break, WHO can declare a “health emer-
gency of international concern” to better 
coordinate international assistance and 
make recommendations to the internation-
al community. The affected countries are 
required to report disease cases immediate-
ly to WHO. In addition, all countries are 
obligated to keep their borders open and to 
not restrict travel or trade. However, these 
rules are not always followed. Sometimes 
disease cases are concealed, and the move-
ment of goods and travelers are restricted 
due to fears about the spreading of the 
disease. This weakens the affected state, 
its market, and its people. 
Assessing who or what is perceived as a 
health risk and the underlying reasons 
reveals links between health and security. 
Health issues can be “securitized” by an 
actor by identifying a suspected health risk 
(e.g., in the form of an infectious disease). 
This actor then promotes this identified risk 
and thus advocates for the risk to be ac-
cepted by other actors. Motivated by their 
own security interests, dominant actors 
can intensify and accelerate this process of 
securitization by directing the discourse in 
a targeted manner. Persons with certain 
(infectious) diseases can thus be portrayed 
as a collective risk. Thereby national secu-
rity interests can prevail over the individu-
al’s right to health. 
The prioritization of national security 
interests becomes particularly obvious 
when high-income countries provide money 
and expertise almost exclusively for the 
detection of – and the response to – 
infectious diseases and the defense against 
bioterrorism. Prevention and rehabilitation, 
on the other hand, are often neglected. The 
central goal of the new “Health Security 
Strategy” of the United States is to protect 
its own population and that of partner 
countries against infectious diseases. 
Investments in health security flow 
primarily to developing countries. How-
ever, in developing countries, many people 
suffer from cardiovascular diseases, tumors, 
 SWP Comment 32 
 August 2019 
 3 
and diabetes in addition to infectious dis-
eases (double burden of disease). Locally, 
health systems often lack funds for needs-
based health care that does not focus 
primarily on infectious disease control. 
A sound scientific assessment of health 
risks in the local context is therefore 
indispensable as a basis for national and 
international political action. 
Health, Security, and Stability 
Health as a non-traditional security issue 
has appeared on the agenda of the UN Secu-
rity Council more and more frequently 
since 2000. On the one hand, this is due 
to new, serious health crises in unstable 
political contexts. On the other hand, the 
Security Council is progressively discussing 
issues that follow an expanded security 
logic, such as climate change as a security 
problem. 
The 2014 Security Council resolution on 
the outbreak of Ebola fever in West Africa 
explicitly and directly described an infec-
tious disease as a threat to peace and secu-
rity. The Security Council thus launched 
the first collective health mission of the 
UN (the United Nations Mission for Ebola 
Emergency Response, UNMEER). However, 
the protection of public health is a consti-
tutional task of WHO. Its independently 
staffed Ebola Interim Assessment Commit-
tee therefore advised against further UN 
missions in the event of future health 
crises. 
In October 2018, the WHO Director-
General addressed the UN Security Council 
regarding the situation in the DRC. The 
Security Council adopted Resolution 2439, 
calling for the protection of and access for 
health workers. Since May 2019, there has 
been a UN emergency coordinator for the 
Ebola outbreak: David Gressly was previ-
ously deputy head of the United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUSCO) peacekeeping mission in the 
DRC and personifies the interface between 
health and security. 
The previous Security Council resolu-
tions with an explicit reference to health 
either established a link between health 
risks and peace, stability, and security or 
dealt with the protection of humanitarian 
personnel, especially peacekeepers. How-
ever, little attention was paid to preventing 
epidemics and building resilient and effi-
cient health systems. These issues are the 
responsibility of the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC). 
In the future, health challenges can be 
better addressed by taking a closer look at 
the interdependencies between health, 
security, and stability. This includes the 
social, political, economic, and military 
conditions and repercussions of health. For 
several years, the economic consequences 
of HIV/AIDS destabilized the seriously 
affected regions of Africa. Disease-related 
absences from work led to productivity 
losses, higher costs for medical care, and 
reduced levels of international investment. 
This can result in growing income dispari-
ties, poverty, and ultimately social and 
political strife. For 41 countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, where around five percent 
of the population is infected with HIV, 
model calculations have shown a reduction 
of the gross domestic product of more than 
two percent per year. If there is a high 
burden of disease, trust in public health 
structures declines and state services can no 
longer be financed. Therefore, diseases can 
even mark a turning point in the devolu-
tion from a fragile to a failed state.  
Time for a New Narrative 
Germany aims to strengthening a value-
driven multilateralism. In the context of 
global health, this could be put into prac-
tice, for example, at the interface between 
health, security, and stabilization. The term 
“global health security” should be scruti-
nized critically. It is an expression of the 
dominance and interests of high-income 
countries and neglects the actual needs of 
the populations in partner countries. In 
order to enforce the right to health, global 
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health policy actors must take into account 
the interests of and trade-offs with other 
policy fields, act as moderators, and stand 
up for health priorities and health-related 
ethical implications. This includes support 
for healthy living conditions, preventive 
measures, the detection and treatment of 
acute and chronic diseases, as well as reha-
bilitation. It is therefore important not to 
solely focus on the treatment of infectious 
diseases. A new narrative could help to 
increase the credibility of the German com-
mitment to global health policy in United 
Nations fora. Thereby partners could also be 
found in the Global South. Instead of threat 
scenarios, the shared risks and shared vul-
nerability of all people could become the 
focus of attention, and the narrative “stabil-
ity through health” could be pursued. This 
could be a turning point away from the 
concept of global health security and to-
ward the striving for equivalence between 
health, security, and stability. 
Germany’s Scope for Action 
Germany could address issues on the Secu-
rity Council’s agenda that lie at the inter-
face of health, security, and stability. This 
would provide an opportunity to apply the 
narrative “stability through health” by 
using a synergistic approach. Local needs 
for comprehensive health care and the 
treatment of infectious diseases would then 
have to be negotiated between partner 
countries – as would the protection of 
humanitarian actors and institutions – 
in an integrated manner. In the Security 
Council, the Arria-formula meetings – 
named after Diego Arria, the former Vene-
zuelan ambassador to the UN – are a suit-
able forum for strengthening a debate 
around epidemic prevention and prepared-
ness. Within this forum, impending hu-
manitarian crises can be considered in their 
wider systemic context. This format can 
also be used to promote new and stronger 
alliances in global health policymaking. 
Donor and recipient countries should 
join forces to strengthen health systems, 
also as part of bilateral development coop-
eration. To this end, the concept of Univer-
sal Health Coverage should be prioritized in 
accordance with WHO recommendations. 
This would mean promoting universal 
access to needs-based health services and 
preventing affected persons from suffering 
financial hardship due to high private 
health expenditures. 
The Ebola outbreak in the DRC demon-
strates the urgent need for intensified coop-
eration. This applies not only to coopera-
tion between health, security, and devel-
opment actors at the local and national 
levels, but also between WHO, the Security 
Council, and ECOSOC. The common goal of 
German global health actors should be to 
establish and sustain resilient, accessible, 
and well-equipped health systems that care 
for people’s needs and prevent, detect, and 
respond to infectious disease. The Federal 
Foreign Office and the Federal Ministries for 
Economic Cooperation and Development; 
for Health; for Education and Research; 
and for Defense could therefore pay greater 
attention to the social function of the 
health sector as a stabilizing factor. 
 
Daniel Gulati and Maike Voss are researchers in the Global Issues division at SWP. Both work in the “Global Health” project, 
which is funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
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